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Abstract: We analyze the 2001 Argentine default on its foreign debt and 
its consequences in terms of the existing literature on sovereign debt 
default. It is our purpose to evaluate this experience and to see to what 
extent the Argentine case requires a re-thinking on the nature and 
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negative economic growth.  Moreover, it corroborates the historical fact 
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1. Introduction  
 Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt in December 2001.  Many analysts thought this 
would lead the country into a long period of stagnation and would make it a pariah in the world’s 
financial markets for a long period of time.  This did not occur.  It is our purpose to analyze this 
experience and to see to what extent the Argentine experience requires a re-thinking on the 
nature and consequences of defaults.  
 
 In this article we shall first examine the general views that have prevailed concerning the 
impact of a default of the sovereign debt.  We review the policies implemented during the 1990s 
and the subsequent collapse of the political and economic regime in 2001-2002. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the Argentinean experience with its default in the period 2001 – 2005 
and its subsequent consequences.  We also review the debt restructuring process that occurred 
during those years. In a final part, we shall speculate on the lessons which can be drawn from 
this experience and the extent to which the existing perception of the nature and consequences of 
defaults might have to be amended. 
 
2. Default on Sovereign Debt: definition, causes and consequences 
A sovereign debt default occurs when a country does not meet a debt payment (principal 
or interest), i.e. it fails to meet the terms of a contractual agreement. A country that repudiates its 
debt faces the threat of sanctions such as loss of access to short term trade credits and seizure of 
assets. In practice, however, the observed punishment does not correspond to what the theory 
predicts. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) state that whereas domestic loans are supported by 
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substantial collateral, the assets that can be appropriated in the event of sovereign’s default are 
negligible. There are also many uncertainties surrounding the actual damage that a lender can 
inflict to a defaulting country (see Bulow and Rogoff, 1989b for a discussion on the legal 
environment). For instance, Lindert and Morton (1989, p.231) examine historical consequences 
of default episodes and conclude that “The majority of non repayers escaped punishment.” Then 
they argue that (p.234): “(…) defaulting governments have seldom been punished, either with 
direct sanctions or with discriminatory denial of later credit.” 
 In fact, the correct incentives for avoiding default are not associated with the collateral 
damage but with the country’s reputation. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that a country’s 
incentive to make repayments is to preserve its future access to international credit markets (for a 
review of the importance of reputation see Eaton and Fernandez, 1995) and international trade. 
Moreover, defaulting on sovereign debt may undermine the country’s capacity to obtain 
beneficial deals in multi-lateral organizations.  
 As surveyed in Rose (1991), losses in trade are perhaps the most important punishment a 
country may receive after defaulting on its debt.  Kaletsky (1985, pp 36-38) argues: “The 
interruption of trade finance might turn out to be the heaviest penalty for a defaulter. Trade 
finance is a critical issue because most trade is conducted on a credit basis of one kind or another 
(...) trade finance could be the ‘Achilles heel’ of a default strategy.” Consistent with this, Cohen 
(1991, p.1) states: “A defaulting country first loses access to its trade credit. Trade, in general, 
becomes difficult, exporting is tricky, and so is paying for its imports.” Rogoff (1999, p.31) 
writes “The strongest weapon of disgruntled creditors, perhaps, is the ability to interfere with 
short-term credits that are the lifeblood of international trade.”  
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 A default can have lasting effects on the country’s economic growth, trade and the 
financial sector. Rose (1991) estimates that a default episode may produce bilateral trade to fall 8 
percent a year for about 15 years. Sturzenegger (2002) when looking at the output costs of the 
defaults in the 1980s finds that the average cumulative drop is of about 4 percent over the 4 years 
immediately following a default. 
 Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) show that the chances of future default increase 
with past default occurrences. These authors introduce the term “debt intolerance” as the extreme 
duress that emerging markets face at debt levels that are quite manageable for the standards of 
industrial economies. Therefore, default can become a way of life. As a consequence, the country 
will have to pay extremely high interest rates for moderate amount of debt. 
 Why do countries default? Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003) distinguish three theoretical 
different causes: (a) liquidity problem (only a cash flow problem); (b) sustainability problem (the 
country may never be able to service its debt out of its own resources); and (c) unwillingness to 
pay (a country decides to stop paying it well before it is insolvent). However, ultimately the 
decision of defaulting resides in the political sphere. On this topic, Bordon and Oosterlinck 
(2005) show a very interesting approach. Their premise is that the decision to default is a 
political one, and therefore political variables may also play a crucial role in understanding the 
decision to default.  Their article suggests that defaulting governments may be politically 
punished for their poor handling of the debt. They found that the likelihood of coups seems 
higher after a debt default, even when one controls for some political variables. However, in 
several instances governments manage to “get away with it”. They suggest that in these cases, it 
is either too hard to overthrow the ruling government or that defaulting on the external debt is 
perceived by the local electors as less harmful than alternative tighter macroeconomic measures. 
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The cheerful celebration of the 2001 Argentine default by the Argentine Congress certainly 
shows that the case studied in this paper should be analyzed in these terms. 
 The fact that defaulting episodes are common also suggests that losses for the defaulter 
are not big enough. Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003) state that the welfare effects of the default 
are unambiguous: on the one hand there are output contractions and financial crises; on the other 
hand it alleviates the fiscal situation because debt payment falls. Zame (1993) even provides a 
theoretical justification of defaulting: This paper argues that default plays an important positive 
role in the economy. If markets are incomplete and traders are only able to enter into contracts 
that they will be able to execute regardless of future events, contingent contracting may be 
severely restricted. Moreover, opening new markets may not relieve these restrictions. Default 
promotes efficiency in a way that opening new markets does not, by making it possible for 
traders to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute with high probability but not with 
certainty.   
Why do, then, markets lend to countries that defaulted? An explanation is found in the 
procyclical nature of capital markets that lent vast sums to emerging markets in boom periods 
(associated with low returns in industrialized countries). In fact, it may be argued that lenders are 
paid accordingly for the risk they take. However, it is this same process that produces “sudden 
stops” in borrowing countries, and that triggers default episodes. 
Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) introduce the term “excusable default”, defined as 
those defaults triggered by bad shocks. Both creditors and debtors have incentives to renegotiate, 
and theoretical results show that it is optimal to have a debt relief (or partial default) that a total 
disruption of debt. The incentives of lenders and borrowers to reschedule or restructure debt 
obligations are quite different. The incentive for lenders is to recover as much possible value of 
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the defaulted debt (provided that the penalty, in terms of seizure of assets, is much smaller than 
the amount defaulted). The incentive from the borrowers view point is to minimize the output 
and other economic costs of a default.  
 
3. An historical account of default episodes 
 Historical evidence suggests that foreign lending to sovereigns has generally been 
characterized by cycles of boom and bust, and associated debt crises. Lindert and Morton (1989) 
find that periods of recurrent debt crises periods include the 1820’s, 1870’s, 1890’s, 1930’s and 
1980’s, which usually followed a wave of international lending, like the British lending spurt of 
the 1850’s to finance railroads in Latin America, the wave of European financing to Argentina in 
the 1880’s, the US led bond financing boom of the late 1920’s, and the bank lending spurt of the 
recycled petro-dollars after the first shock of 1973.  
 Many countries that have defaulted on their external debts have done so repeatedly. 
Including the most recent episode, Argentina has defaulted 5 times since 1824 (Beim and 
Calomiris, 2001), repeatedly in every default cycle. This is not an exclusive characteristic of 
Argentina provided that other countries in the region have defaulted on a similar number of 
occasions. For instance, Brazil and Colombia has done it 7 times while Venezuela 9 times. 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) calculate that Argentina was in a state of default or 
restructuring 25% of the time in the period 1824-1999, a similar number applies for Brazil, while 
an even higher percentage (38%) occurred in Colombia and Venezuela. Standard and Poor’s 
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survey of default episodes4
 If this historical account tells anything is that defaulting is not new. However, the latest 
Argentine case in 2001 has some distinctive characteristic that puts it in the Guiness record of the 
default history: it was the largest in the history of international bonds with over $82 billion. 
 finds 84 events of sovereign default on private-source debt between 
1975 and 2002.  
  
4. The Collapse of the Currency Board and the Argentine Default 
 In order to end what had become as a chronic situation of hyperinflation, Argentina 
introduced a currency board in 1991, the so-called Convertibilidad. Among its major features 
were:  1) the introduction of a new currency, the peso (which amounted 10,000 Australes), which 
was set at an exchange rate of one peso to one U.S. dollar, and which was perfectly convertible;  
2) a new law was introduced which permitted the Central Bank to issue new pesos only against 
new foreign exchange reserves. The Convertibilidad had many aspects of a dollarization: 
contracts made in dollars acquired the same status as those made in the local currency (including 
bank deposits and credits, see below).  
Table 2 shows the positive results of the Convertibilidad regime – inflation came to an 
end, there was an initial period of high growth rates, and, as shown in Table 3, there was a 
substantial surge in capital inflows. This new regime did not prohibit the state from having 
budget deficits.  However, such deficits could not be financed by the Central Bank, but only 
through borrowing. Much of the latter consisted of foreign borrowing.   
 The first two columns of Table 1 present a fact that was characteristic during the 
Convertibility: the Public Sector had, on average, primary fiscal surpluses, except on the years 
                                                 
4 Standard and Poor’s definition of a default episode includes any missed principal and/or interest payment as well 
as outright repudiation. There is thus considerable variation in the severity of the default episodes. 
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when external shocks affected the economy, i.e. the 1995 tequila effect and the Russian crisis of 
1998. However, the public sector continued to be in deficit. There are two main explanations for 
this primary fiscal surplus with fiscal deficit: 1) the payments of the debt services, which grew 
from approximately 4% of the GDP around 1993 to more than 10% by the end of the decade and 
2) the need to finance the social security system with pesos, as most of the young taxpayers had 
transferred to the private system. In 1994 the Argentine government partially privatized the 
public pay-as-you-go social security system that had been in existence since 1967. This decision 
was strongly promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF and had a major impact 
on Argentina’s fiscal accounts.  Cibils and Lo Vuolo (2007) argue that the lost of revenue, plus 
accumulated interest costs, amounted to nearly the entire government budget deficit in 2001. 
 As a by product of the Convertibilidad the Argentine economy was especially vulnerable 
to foreign crises. The Asian crisis caused capital to flow out and the Brazilian devaluation made 
the trade deficit worse. As dollars were flowing out of the currency board, the decline of the 
dollar reserves reduced the money supply and raised interest rates, which again worsened the 
recession.  
 It is noted in Table 2 that the growth rate of Argentina’s GDP began to slow down in 
1998 and in 1999 it began to experience a negative growth rate, which would last until 2003. The 
most pronounced decline occurred in 2001 and 2002, when the country experience the collapse 
of the currency board system. This decline in growth also produced dramatic increases in 
poverty.  For instance, unemployment grew from 13.2% in 1998 to 21.5% in 2002; the 
proportion of the population living below the poverty line grew from 35.9% in 1998 to 57.5% in 
2002.  Moreover the rate of investment, which was already declining in the late 1990s, took a 
plunge from 1999 on, dropping from 19.1 percent of GDP to 11.3 percent in 2002.  
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By the time of De la Rua’s government, there was a consensus among economists that 
devaluation was imperative. Policymakers hesitated due to their perceived financial and political 
risks involved and the De la Rua’s government elected in 1999 adhered to the view that the main 
problem was not the exchange rate appreciation but fiscal deficit. This vision led the government 
to have a tight fiscal policy with the expectation that fiscal adjustment would entail lower risk 
premiums and consequently interest rates, which in turn would reduce the debt service payments, 
one of the principal components of the public expenditure. However, these policies reinforced 
the recessionary trend and undermine market confidence in the viability of the Convertibilidad. 
By the second half of 2001 the public began to fear the possibility of devaluation and 
there was increasing speculation against the peso.  The situation was worsened by a unique 
feature of the Convertibilidad. In particular, local banks were able to offer deposits in foreign 
currency to the general public, and the Central Bank guaranteed that these were secured. 
Therefore the peso speculation converted into a bank run, as the public withdrew their savings 
from foreign based accounts into cash. 
 In order to sustain the Convertibilidad, the government established severe restrictions on 
capital movements and cash withdrawals from banks in December (named the “corralito”). This 
measure infuriated the general public and produced massive social unrest and political 
commotion. To avoid a massive peso withdrawal from the banks the government declared a bank 
holiday on December 20th, which lasted until January 3rd, 2002. The collapse of the De la Rua’s 
government and the successive governments led to the abandonment of the currency board. 
Moreover, the Duhalde government decided to compulsively convert foreign-currency bank 
deposits into pesos at a rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar when the market rate was 2 and even reached 
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4 pesos per dollar (this set of measures is known as the “corralón”). Additionally, to avoid a 
generalized bankruptcy bank credits in dollars were converted at a rate of one-to-one rate. 
On December 24th the service payments of a significant part of the public debt were 
suspended (it initially affected 61.8 billion dollars in public bonds and 8 in other debt 
instruments). It did not include debt contracted with multilateral institutions (such as the IMF, 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) of about 32.4 billion dollars and 
recently issued guaranteed loans (42.3 billions). This turned out to be the largest default in Latin 
American economic history, as the foreign private debt amounted to US$ 82 billion out of US$ 
153 billion. 
 
5. The Resurrection of Argentine’s Economy: 2003- 2006 
  
Argentina’s recovery from these economic depths was due in large part to the 
improvement in the trade balance.  It will be noted in Table 2 that it went from being negative in 
the late 1990s to a surplus in 2000, and this surplus rose dramatically in the subsequent years.  
The surplus was the result of two factors.  First, the country’s exports, which hardly ever 
declined, rose substantially, as a result of both a strong world demand for the country’s products, 
and also the substantial devaluation of the peso.  Second, there was a dramatic decline of 
imports, due to both the rise of poverty levels and the decline of investments.  
The Argentinean default could have not occurred at a better time: the default itself 
eliminated one of the principal components of the public deficit, that is, the need to pay huge 
sums as interest on the debt, and by 2002 the prices of the Argentinean exports were rising 
dramatically.  
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Overall the collapse of the Argentine financial system did not have any significant effect 
on international trade. The fact that there were not disruption after the default may be explained 
by the fact that Argentine’s exports were concentrated on traditional agricultural markets and 
primary goods with well established financial services and prices on the rise, or tied to the 
Mercosur with politically managed quotas. As a result, the process was one of a classical 
competitive devaluation, and this superseded the negative financial effects of the default. 
 The strong growth of exports also strengthened the finances of the government, as the 
major export items were taxed (retentions).  In fact, the government’s budget had a surplus from 
2003 on. However, as in the case of government revenues, the level of expenditures also 
expanded, which, in turn, contributed to economic expansion. 
 The devaluation of the currency did not produce an immediate rise in the level of prices, 
mostly due to the existing high unemployment rate and to the freeze of public utilities’ prices and 
other price controls introduced by the Duhalde and (mainly) Kirchner governments. Damill et al. 
(2005) attributes the economic recovery to the achievement of a new macroeconomic 
equilibrium. Those authors stress that the policies implemented were different from those 
common in the 1990s. In particular the new governments imposed new exchange rules that 
compelled exporters to liquidate dollars in the local market and imposed capital controls. In fact 
these measures were so successful that the Central Bank was compelled to absorb the excess of 
foreign currency to avoid the appreciation of the peso. 
 
6. The debt restructuring process 
 The extra premium paid by Argentine bonds (the so-called `riesgo-país’) significantly 
influenced the Menem and De la Rua’s governments’ decisions. As financial markets disbelieved 
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the country’s capacity to repay its foreign debt, those governments introduced tighter fiscal 
policies. However, following the contractionary policies, markets offered a higher discount on 
those bonds, which in fact worsened the country’s financial situation. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of this variable for the period under analysis. As expected, the default is followed by 
an exorbitant spike in this series. 
Negotiations with bondholders, which began in 2002, dragged on until June 2005, when 
President Nestor Kirchner made an offer which consisted of the exchange of old bonds for new 
ones (for an excellent review of the negotiation process see Damill et al., 2005).  The new bonds 
amounted to 25% of the value of the old debt.  Kirchner made it clear that this offer was not 
negotiable and he gave bondholders one month to accept or reject the offer.  Within that time 
76% of the bondholders accepted the offer. The remaining 24% were not repaid and as of 2007 
were still trying to regain their investment through foreign legal actions. 
 Mortimore and Stanley (2006) pointed out that the unilateral offer was indirectly 
supported by the other actors’ inaction and lack of initiative, together with extraordinarily good 
international conditions. Both the IMF and developed countries’ governments adopted a laissez-
faire approach to the sovereign crisis resolution. Moreover, the low interest rates in the United 
States, and the narrowing of emerging bond spreads improved the conditions of the offer. The 
government also took for granted the position of local financial investors (mostly retirement and 
pension administrators who were obliged to invest a certain proportion of their capital in public 
bonds) which provided a “floor of acceptance” of about 30 percent. Those authors also point out 
that the Argentinean government had a strong bargaining position due to the atomicity of the 
shareholders and the coordination problems among them. 
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7. The Argentinean Default in Historical Perspective 
 How did the recent Argentinean default and its aftermath conform to default literature 
which we reviewed at the beginning of this essay?   
Immediate Sanctions. Most studies have found that the governments of defaulting 
countries have assets abroad whose value is small (such as embassy buildings and small 
implements of diplomacy).  In the case of Argentina the value of such assets is minuscule 
compared to the country’s foreign debt. Threat of sanctions and seizure of assets occurred only 
rarely.  In the case of the recent Argentine default some bondholders tried to take legal actions in 
the courts of New York in order to attach Argentinean Central Bank funds in the New York 
Federal Reserve. However, it proved difficult for them to convince the courts.  The latter held 
that since Argentinean funds belonged to Argentina’s Central Bank, which was considered an 
entity separate from the Argentinean government, the claims had to be denied.5
 
 
Future Sanctions.  Another type of sanction is the loss of access to international credit.  
Table 6 contains the amount of international credit and the premium it had to pay in the years 
1991 to 2006.  It will be noted that the amount of credit declined dramatically in 2001 and 
reached a low point in 2005 (there is no information for 2002 to 2004 because the country was in 
total default and there were no financial operations).  Credit began to flow in again in 2005 and 
by 2006 reaching the levels of 1994-5.  Thus these type of sanctions were of short durations, and 
one can conclude that the evidence shows a myopic view of the default.  
It should also be noted in Table 5 that net foreign credit to Argentina began to decline 
before the default.  The table shows that net foreign portfolio investment dropped from US$ 11 
                                                 
5  United States Court of  Appeals for the Second Circuit, August Term, 2006.  Docket Nos. 06-0403-cv, 06-
0405-cv, 06-0406-cv. 
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billion in 1998 to US$ 8.7 billion in 1999 and to US$ -6.8 billion in 2000.  Although the decline 
in 2002 can be interpreted as reflecting the default, this is not the case of the previous years. 
Thus the declining in the inflow of portfolio capital cannot be solely blamed in the default, but 
rather on the deterioration of the economic situation and especially the increased evidence of the 
lack of sustainability of the Convertibilidad. 
 
An important point to be made is that the end of the Convertibilidad entirely changes the 
dependence of Argentina on foreign capital. During the 1990s the emission of debt was mainly 
associated with the necessity of acquiring foreign reserves to maintain the currency board and the 
payment of interest. After 2002, both conditions disappeared, and this gave the Argentine 
government more room to negotiate. 
 
Impact on Growth and Trade   Table 2 indicates that the default had little impact on either 
growth or trade, where the theory predicts the biggest consequences of a default.  The dramatic 
decline of growth in the years 2001-2 was a direct consequence of the collapse of the currency 
board, and it can be claimed that the default was the result of the crisis rather than the cause of it. 
The default may not be separated from the deep economic recession and regime’s collapse, and 
therefore its specific contribution may be difficult to quantify. In addition, the resumption of 
spectacular rates of growth in 2003 had little to do with the default.  As far as trade is concerned, 
exports stayed at about the same level in the years 1997 – 2002, while dramatically rising in the 
years 2003-2006. As far as imports are concerned, their decline began in 1998, plunging in 2002, 
but recovered rapidly after 2003.  Import declines cannot be explained by a lack of credit related 
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to the default, but rather by the dramatic decline of the GDP, the decline of investments and the 
spurt in import prices due to the devaluation of the currency.  
In addition, the default did not reduce foreign direct investment (FDI), which was a 
feared consequence. Table 5 shows that even in the worse time of the crisis, that is 2002, FDI , 
though substantially lower, never disappeared. Also, the collapse of the financial system should 
certainly not be attributed to the default but to the non-sustainability of the Convertibilidad. The 
internal financial system recovered very fast after the new macroeconomic equilibrium was put 
into place. Moreover, when the debt restructuring process was finalized, the ‘riesgo-país’ 
reached the same level of 1997, the golden years of the Convertibilidad (see Figure 1). Again, 
this shows that markets may be more myopic than what the literature on defaulting debt believes.  
It thus seems that what led to the disaster of 2001-2 was due to internal problems: the 
lack of an internal adjustment to accompany the currency board, which led to an untenable 
external debt situation.  The default was a “way out” and Argentina got away with it due to the 
favorable external conditions, leading to huge trade surpluses, which led to growth and the 
growth led to a softening of the country’s bad international reputation in the credit markets.  The 
default could certainly not have been declared at a better time. 
Also, the fact that Argentina was smart enough not to default with the multilateral 
institutions was crucial because this line of credit remained open and the Argentine government 
made the announcement regarding the debt restructuring proposals at the annual meetings of the 
IMF and the World Bank (the Dubai proposal, September 2003).  
The Argentine default can also be interpreted in terms of Grossman and Van Huyck 
(1988) term “excusable default”: Argentina was in a very deep recession and in order to maintain 
the Convertibilidad and pay the foreign debt, contractionary monetary policies were needed 
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which would have made the political situation unsustainable. In the same line of thought, 
Mortimore and Stanley (2006) state that democratic governments, when confronted with a social 
crisis, put their electorate before their investors. Moreover, in terms of Zame (1993) analysis, 
where contractual debt obligations could not be changed, the default offered the possibility of a 
renegotiation of the debt with a capital and interest flow in the range of the country’s 
possibilities.  
Was the default really necessary? As can be seen in Table 4, it dramatically alleviated the 
government’s burden, as debt servicing as a proportion of total government expenditures 
declined to 9.2% in 2004. However, the servicing of the debt might have been quite manageable 
in an expansionary period. Chuhan and Sturzzenegger (2003) suggest that how the default is 
implemented is not independent of the motives of the default. These authors suggest that 
countries with unwillingness to pay are more inclined to broad-based default. However, the fact 
that the default was done in a climate of political turmoil, mostly as a reaction to the failure of 
the policies implemented in the previous decade showed that the default was an immediate 
necessity rather than an unwillingness to recognize the debt. It was celebrated by the Congress as 
a political triumph with the expectation that it was necessary to avoid further macroeconomic 
restrictions.  In a framework of fiscal, financial and political crisis, defaulting on foreign 
creditors was a short-term fiscal alleviation whose consequences would be the responsibility of 
an unknown future government.  
In terms of the Bordon and Oosterlinck (2005) analysis of whether governments “get 
away with it,” it should be noted that the temporary president who followed De la Rua and who 
was responsible for formally declaring the debt default, Rodolfo Rodriguez Saa, may have been 
punished by a crash in his political aspirations at the national level.  
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7. Conclusions 
The Argentine default provides a very important framework to evaluate the literature on 
sovereign debt default. The lessons that this experience gives us should be used to evaluate the 
possible consequences of other future defaults. 
Two important points need to be made, which are special features of the Argentine case. 
First, Argentina faced several favorable conditions in the aftermath of the 2002 economic crisis. 
The abandonment of the currency board alleviated the government’s dependence on foreign 
capital and placed the country on a positive growth path that lasted several years. Moreover the 
country’s terms of trade entered in a favorable phase which significantly contributed to the 
economic growth. Second, the fact that the default was declared concurrently with a catastrophic 
economic, political and social crisis reduced its significance and it made multilateral institutions 
more sympathetic to the Argentine government debt restructuring process. 
Even when it is impossible to isolate the effect of the default from other concurrent 
episodes, the evidence points to the fact that the long lasting negative effects predicted by the 
literature were not present in this case.  
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Table 1 - Argentina: Fiscal Deficit and Foreign Debt 
 
 Primary Fiscal Deficit, 
National Public Sector 
without provinces 
(in millions of pesos of 
2004) 
Fiscal Deficit, 
National Public 
Sector without 
provinces 
(in millions of pesos 
of 2004) 
Foreign Debt 
(In millions of U.S. $) 
1990 11347.0 17458.1  
1991 -118.2 5710.5  
1992 -7388.6 1961.5  
1993 -6607.5 65.1  
1994 843.7 1267.7 87,524 
1995 4383.8 13589.7 101,462 
1996 6041.2 15385.4 114,423 
1997 -4192.4 7866.7 129,964 
1998 -1177.8 13057.4 147,634 
1999 5836.8 23665.1 152,563 
2000 -3932.4 17117.2 155,014 
2001 9769.8 35049.0 166,272 
2002 -7037.7 3108.0 156,748 
2003 -15737.1 -6322.4 164,645 
2004 -23253.4 -15851.4 171,205 
2005 -11169.8 -8384.6 113,804 
2006 -14762.0 -9420.7 107,818 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda, Ministerio de Economía. 
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Table 2 - Argentina: GDP Growth and the Trade Balance 
 
 GDP Growth 
Rate 
Investment/ 
GDP Ratio 
(1993 
prices) 
Exports 
(millions of 
US$) 
Imports  
(millions of 
US$) 
Trade 
Balance 
(millions of 
US$) 
1993 8.06 19.1 13,269 17,133 -3864 
1994 5.84 20.5 16,023 21,675 -5,652 
1995 -2.85 18.3 21,162 20,200 962 
1996 5.53 18.9 24,043 23,855 188 
1997 8.11 20.6 26,431 30,450 -4,019 
1998 3.85 21.1 26,434 31,377 -4,943 
1999 -3.39 19.1 23,309 25.508 -2,199 
2000 -0.79 17.9 26,341 25,281 1,060 
2001 -4.41 15.8 26,543 20,320 6,223 
2002 -10.89 11.3 25,561 8,990 16,571 
2003 8.84 14.3 29,939 13,851 16,088 
2004 9.03 17.7 34,576 22,445 12,131 
2005 9.18 19.8 40,106 28,689 11,417 
2006 8.90 21.6 46,275 39,530 6,745 
Source:   INDEC. 
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Table 3A - Unemployment 
 
 May October 
1998 13.2 12.4 
1999 14.5 13.8 
2000 15.4 14.7 
2001 16.4 18.3 
2002 21.5 17.8 
2003 19.1 15.4 
2004 14.6 12.6 
2005 12.5 10.6 
2006 10.9 9.5 
Source:  INDEC. 
 
Table 3B - Percent of Households and Persons Living Below Poverty 
Line. 
 
 Households Persons 
May 2001 26.2 35.9 
October 2001 28.0 38.3 
May 2002 41.4 53.0 
October 2002 45.7 57.5 
May 2003 42.6 54.7 
October 2003 36.5 47.8 
May 2004 33.5 44.3 
October 2004 29.8 40.2 
May 2005 28.8 38.9 
October 2005 24.7 33.8 
May 2006 23.1 31.4 
Source: INDEC 
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Table 4 - Argentina: Capital Flows, Debt Servicing and Reserves 
(millions of US $) 
 Net Capital 
Flows 
Debt Service 
In millions of 
2004 pesos 
Debt Service as 
% of Total 
Public 
Expenditures 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserves 
1993 14,196 5120.7 4.29 17,393 
1994 13,781 5995.9 4.63 17,922 
1995 7,701 7823.6 6.32 18,506 
1996 12, 249 7576.0 6.12 21,578 
1997 17,709 10151.1 7.80 24,633 
1998 18,354 11850.4 8.52 27,867 
1999 13,772 15010.1 10.04 28,765 
2000 8,732 20302.5 13.85 28,260 
2001 -5,442 23942.1 15.67 18,398 
2002 -11,404 9050.6 9.61 10,476 
2003 -3,203 6478.9 6.46 14,119 
2004 2,022 4563.5 4.05 19,646 
2005 3,013 6338.4 5.33 28,077 
2006 -5,629 6320.0 4.55 32,037 
2007 NA NA NA 43,002* 
* As of September 18, 2007 
Source: INDEC; Secretaria de Hacienda, Ministerio de Economía. 
. 
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Table 5 – FDI and Foreign Portfolio 
 
 Foreign Direct Investment 
(millions of US$) 
Foreign Portfolio 
Investment 
(millions of US$) 
1991 2439.0 483.0 
1992 4431.0 4860.1 
1993 2793.1 34402.5 
1994 3634.9 9461.3 
1995 5609.4 2313.5 
1996 6948.5 9594.2 
1997 9160.3 11024.4 
1998 7290.7 8787.8 
1999 23987.7 -6784.9 
2000 10418.3 -2583.6 
2001 2166.1 -9503.3 
2002 2148.9 -4640.3 
2003 1652.0 -7758.1 
2004 4124.7 -9415.6 
2005 5265.2 -670.5 
2006 5491.0 6531.6 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook  
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Table 6 - Argentinean Government: Access to Credit, 1991 – 2007  
 
  
  
Issued amount in millions of  US$ 
  
Nominal issued amount weighted average  
Year Number  of Issues 
Nominal 
Value  
Effective 
value 
Life 
Average  
(years) 
Yield                 
(semiannual 
base) 
Spread 
over 
UST 
Coupon 
1991 2 500 499 2.0 10.40% 452 10.40% 
1992 1 250 250 5.0 8.25% 300 8.25% 
1993 6 2,121 2,120 6.9 8.07% 278 8.08% 
1994** 19 2,600 2,600 3.3 8.93% 238 8.50% 
1995 16 4,726 4,721 3.6 9.98% 365 8.24% 
1996 44 13,050 12,879 6.7 8.98% 339 8.87% 
1997 44 11,424 11,370 8.4 8.70% 257 8.89% 
1998 55 14,990 14,956 10.7 8.63% 421 9.07% 
1999 83 15,549 14,820 7.0 10.34% 577 9.89% 
2000 80 16,489 16,081 7.6 10.89% 535 10.61% 
2001 38 6,280 5,911 9.9 14.22% 970 14.35% 
1991-
2001 388 87,979 86,206 7.8 9.89% 464 9.75% 
2005 11 2,986 2,530 5.00 8.38% 418   
2006 14 5,365 4,686 4.40 8.17% 342   
2007 10 6,106 5,581 9.63 9.11% 461  
2005-
2007 35 14457 12797 6.73 8.61% 407.96   
* Excluding debt exchanges; **Excluding USD 500-million Syndicate Loan. 
Source: Secretaría de Finanzas, Ministerio de Economía. 
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Figure 1 - Country risk, 1997 - 2007 
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